1. "Most agency officials are too afraid to violate the law or at the least incur the possibility of a certain transaction being disallowed. A lot of the conditions created by the aftermath of the typhoon are unexpected and therefore awaiting a new set of guidance. The bureaucratic structure and reliance on written guide permeate the difficult situation of being able to respond immediately. The nature of relief goods, majority of which are perishable, the conditions of the victims and the limitations where agents of the government operate, double the difficulty of responding to a huge calamity such as typhoon Yolanda. What is saddening is while there is an increasing need for the government to spend its resources, which are readily available, they can hardly trickle down to the succeeding levels of government in order to reach the victims because state actors are either too reluctant to act if there are no rules or they insist on following longstanding procedures as if there are no emergencies"
     

  2. "

    As for prevention and mitigation, foresight and proactiveness are still the missing essential components of many DRRM Plans. The audit results show that development programs are highly reactive, done intermittently or only when there are disasters. Many DRRM programs and projects are also not sustained because they are not mainstreamed into development plans and more importantly, into national and local policies.

    Moreover, some LGUs were not able to fully utilize their LDRRMF or have not implemented the programs/projects/activities stipulated in their plans, as reported in the Annual Financial Report for calendar year 2012. Some LGUs also charged expenditures against the LDRRMF that were not related to disaster risk management.

    "
     

  3. "

    What appears to have been at work is a problematic multiculturalism to which European countries have subscribed too easily. It’s the kind of multiculturalism that is really a form of separatism: you stay in your enclave and we’ll stay in ours; it’s the kind that David Cameron has faulted for failing to offer a vision of a more inclusive British society for young Muslims, and for creating a niche in which extremist ideology can grow.

    In Rotherham, it appears to have done something else: blunted effective law enforcement. Under the multiculturalist approach that seems to have informed Rotherham politics, cultures are unified, even monolithic. They have “spokesmen” who represent “the” community and its customs. Police contact with the Pakistani community travelled, according to the Rotherham report, through traditional channels and were “almost exclusively with men.” Child sexual exploitation was, apparently, not a topic that they took up.

    Not talking to women meant, among other things, that the police missed an opportunity to connect with people who might tell them about abuse within the Pakistani community. The approach seems to have been based on an assumption of Pakistani insularity—an assumption that cloaked itself, sincerely or strategically, in the garb of cultural sensitivity. Writing in the Guardian this week, the columnist Samira Ahmed faulted “a ‘bullying and macho’ deal-making culture involving the local authority and the male, self-appointed leadership of the Pakistani Muslim community.”

    "
     

  4. "

    Management’s replies/actions to the foregoing audit observations were as follows:

    a. the copies of MOA between CHED and the SUCs were submitted to COA together with the confirmation letters from the SUCs acknowledging the amount they received from CHED for their RDE projects;

    b. CHED had already written the SUCs to hasten the submission of liquidation documents. In addition the SUCs were advised that the second tranche or the 30 per cent of the remaining fund allocation could not be released until 75 per cent of the first tranche is liquidated accompanied by an accomplishment report;

    c. as to the remaining P2,090,123.24 in the custody of CHED, the amount shall be returned upon confirmation that there was no longer pending project proposal covered by the MOA;

    d. the amount of P19.236 million was deposited with the Land Bank of the Philippines (Quezon City Circle Branch) Local Currency account which is a non-interest bearing account while the P19.236 and the interest that accrued thereon are earmarked for the related research projects of the Institute.

    "
    — 

    COA Audit Report on the Philippine Institute for Development Studies

    Why wasn’t this reported on by the media?

     

  5. "

    Most mass media in the Philippines are run by advertisements. Even the largest broadsheets in the country cashin on ads that the inflow of funds from circulation pales incomparison. This makes the local media dependent on privatebusinesses and the government, which are the biggest advertisers.Ads could be the reason why large media networks practice self-censorship. During
    Martial Law, Marcos paid movie advertisersto withhold ads in the anti-government Manila Times (Lent, 1974).During Joseph Estrada’s administration, the Office of the President sued the Philippine Daily Inquirer for publishing an interview thatimplicated him in a money laundering scandal. Estrada then bargained with the Inquirer, threatening to pullout all governmentads from the newspaper (CPJ, 2000). The Arroyo government alsothreatened to create a clearinghouse for government ads.

    Other private interests, the big corporations in particular, alsocontribute to media repression in the country.

    "
    — 

    "Silent Assault: Multilevel Censorship as Media Repression in the Philippines"

    Interesting links to #MCPIF and the Cybercrime Law of 2012.

     
  6. Gabino Reyes Congson Philippine Magazine Cover - My Turn!

    October 1939.

     

  7. "The scale of abuses in the Philippines remains unknowable, but, as early as March, rhetoric like Root’s was being undercut by further revelations from the islands. When Major Littleton Waller, of the Marines, appeared before a court-martial in Manila that month, unprecedented public attention fell on the brutal extremities of U.S. combat, specifically on the island of Samar in late 1901. In the wake of a surprise attack by Filipino revolutionaries on American troops in the town of Balangiga, which had killed forty-eight of seventy-four members of an American Army company, Waller and his forces were deployed on a search-and-destroy mission across the island. During an ill-fated march into the island’s uncharted interior, Waller had become lost, feverish, and paranoid. Believing that Filipino guides and carriers in the service of his marines were guilty of treachery, he ordered eleven of them summarily shot. During his court-martial, Waller testified that he had been under orders from the volatile, aging Brigadier General Jacob Smith (“Hell-Roaring Jake,” to his comrades) to transform the island into a “howling wilderness,” to “kill and burn” to the greatest degree possible—“The more you kill and burn, the better it will please me”—and to shoot anyone “capable of bearing arms.”"
    — The Water Cure - The New Yorker
     

  8. "

    Mr. President, the Senator himself and the evidence coming from our two commanders, General Otis and Admiral Dewey, and witnesses for whom they vouch, refute every one of the propositions of fact on which my honorable friend has built his glittering temple of glass. He describes the impotence and ineffectual attempt of Spain for three hundred years to reduce that people to subjection: tells us that she had failed. He counsels us to avoid the errors and the mistakes and the sins she has committed. If that be true, Mr. President, where did Spain get the right to sell the people of the Philippine Islands to us? They had risen against that effete and impotent and ineffectual effort of Spain; they had driven her from the entire soil of their island, save a single city; they hemmed in her troops in that single city of Manila by a cordon of their troops stretching from water to water; and Spain surrendered to us only because her soldiers could not get out of reach of the American guns without being compelled to surrender to the Filipinos.

    I think you will have to enlarge the doctrines of the American Declaration of Independence. I think you will have to build anew a Constitution which, he says, is only an instrument and not a rule of duty, before you can find your right to buy and sell that people like sheep.

    "
     

  9. "

    The Internet might be a useful tool for activists and organizers, in episodes from the Arab Spring to the Ice Bucket Challenge. But over all, it has diminished rather than enhanced political participation, according to new data.

    Social media, like Twitter and Facebook, has the effect of tamping down diversity of opinion and stifling debate about public affairs. It makes people less likely to voice opinions, particularly when they think their views differ from those of their friends, according to a report published Tuesday by researchers at Pew Research Center and Rutgers University.

    "
     

  10. "

    It seems to me that the task of legal philosophy today is twofold. It must keep clear its intrinsic relationship with, and dependence upon, all the truths of moral and political philosophy, not least by providing a constant critique of every form of legal philosophy that denies or distorts that relationship. And by its mastery, and its foundational explanatory understanding, of the law‘s technical instrumentarium it must remain in a position to criticize and expose – in the hope of deflecting — every manipulation of it for purposes destructive of the common good, a good that includes but is not exhausted by the upholding of juridically cognizable rights.

    Of special importance in the coming decades will be a recovery of awareness amongst legal philosophers that law‘s paradigmatic form, the ius civile, is the law of a people, posited by a constituent act (or constitutive custom) and ongoing legislative acts of their self-determination as a people, acts which can and should be consistent with their obligations to do and respect right (human rights, as contained in the ius naturale) and their responsibilities towards other peoples and those other peoples‘ self-determination, rights and needs. Just as countless thinkers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries too casually assumed the justice of communist notions of a propertyless community, notions inadequately attentive to the long-term conditions of a sustainable, prosperous and just society of free persons, with the result that countless millions of people suffered more or less directly from the application in their polities of these errors of practical thought, so likewise many thinkers today too casually assume (explicitly or implicitly) the justice of quasi-communist notions of a borderless humanity, notions incompatible with the long-term conditions of a sustainably just and civilly free political order and Rule of Law. Even in the short term, this kind of error of practical thought results in the kind of political community increasingly familiar, whose peoples‘ multi-cultural internal diversity of ultimate allegiances is both promoted and countered by an ever-growing apparatus of security and surveillance, a severe diminution in freedom of political and intellectual discourse, and an explosion of law-making and regulatory bureaucracy indifferent to the benefit of having a society whose self-determination takes in large measure the form of that sharing of expectations which Ulpian and Aquinas called common custom.

    Practitioners of the philosophy of law may be especially susceptible to this kind of error, to the extent that they envision legal systems simply as sets of norms, rather than as the principles, norms and institutions adopted by a people extended in time and in territorial bounds, in more or less adequate fulfilment of its moral responsibility to do so.24

    "